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I. OVERVIEW OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT
A. What It Requires And Whom It Protects
The prevailing wage concept dates back to the federal
Davis-Bacon Act of 1931,' one of the oldest fair labor standards statutes in the country.2 The prevailing wage concept is one of neutrality and as embodied in the
Davis-Bacon Act requires that contractors engaged in
federal government construction projects must pay their
employees at wage rates not less than local "prevailing
3
wages" as determined by the U.S. Department of Labor.
Since 1931 over sixty federal statutes have been enacted
with provisions requiring that prevailing wages be paid 4 and
forty states have statutes paralleling the Davis-Bacon Act,5
affectionately referred to as "Little Davis Bacon Acts".
Despite the little attention paid to it in legal literature,
the Davis-Bacon Act annually affects approximately four
million workers and over fifty billion dollars spent on
government subsidized construction. The Act and the
regulations promulgated for its enforcement establish those
wage rates and fringe benefit payments that prevail for each
Lisa Morowitz is a J.D. Candidate, May 1990, State
University of New York at Buffalo School at Law.
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craft in an area as the legal minimum wage rates payable
on federally financed construction projects in excess of
$2000.6 The Act thus encourages uniform labor wage rates
that are consistent with local practice. In so doing, the
Davis-Bacon Act parallels the federal labor policy, embodied in the NLRA, to avoid competition on the basis of
wage rates and to "promote the flow of commerce by
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and
unrest.7 The Supreme Court has recognized that "(o)n its
face, the Act is a minimum wage law designed for the
benefit of construction workers."8
B. How It Works
A review of the Act's administration and history aids
in understanding the meaning of Davis-Bacon enforcement
for workers involved on construction projects. Davis-Bacon
contracts involve the following parties: the Federal agency
(often called the procurement or contracting agency) under
whose auspices the work is conducted (e.g. Dept. of
Transportation, Energy, Housing etc.); the Contractor who
bids on the project and then undertakes and supervises the
construction (often referred to as the employer); the Subcontractor who works on one particular part of the project
(e.g. the painting, electric work); and the Laborers and
Mechanics who actually do the manual labor (often referred to as employees or workers).
i. Administration
Within the Department of Labor (DOL), Davis-Bacon
is the responsibility of the Office of Government Contract
Wage Standards, which is a unit of the Wage & Hour Division in the Employment Standards Administration. 9
Prevailing wage rates are determined by the DOL for each
construction occupation used in different types of construction in specific U.S. localities. This requires the classification of workers (e.g. carpenters, electricians, iron workers
etc.)"0 as well as the classification of projects (e.g. building
construction, heavy construction, highway constructon and
residential building).
The word "prevailing" in the statute has recently been
interpreted by the DOL to mean "the wage paid to the majority of the laborers or mechanics in the classification on
similar projects in the area during the period in question.
If the same wage is not paid to a majority of those employed
in the classification, the 'prevailing wage' shall be the
average of the wages paid weighted by the total employed

9Q

I

in the classification.""
In compiling wage rate information, the Employment
Standards Administration's Wage and Hour Division considers statements voluntarily submitted by contractors
showing wage rates actually paid on projects, collective
bargaining agreements, wage rates determined for public
construction by state and local officials pursuant to prevailfurnished by federal
ing wage legislation, and information
2
and state contracting agencies.'
It is frequently alleged that unions have an advantage
under these regulations since their contracts usually require
all workers of one classification to be paid the same rate
to the penny, and, of the relevant interest groups, unions
have the strongest incentive to submit wage rate information.1 3 Persuasive arguments are made, however, refuting
the alleged "union bias" in the administration of the Act.
Based on its examination of every area and project wage
determination issued by the DOL in the first four months
of 1986, the National Joint Heavy and Highway Construction Committee reported that 42.6 percent of all area determinations provided wage rates that were union rates, and
only 23 percent of all project wage determinations were
union. Thus, only 26.2 percent of all wage decisions issued
in the first four months of 1986 were based on union
rates.' 4 Despite the controversy it is evident that in a locale
where'the majority of construction workers are unionized,' 5
the union wage will be determined to be the prevailing wage.
Likewise, where the majority of construction work is performed on a nonunion basis, the Davis-Bacon wage determinations will reflect the nonunion character of the industry.
ii. Allocation of Enforcement Functions
The Davis-Bacon Act does not assign overall enforcement responsibilities to any one agency. Rather, it is the
function of the various federal contracting agencies to ensure that employees are properly classified and to withhold
funds in the event of underpayment.' 6 Thus, the primary
responsibility for day-to-day enforcement such as checking employer payroll records and making on-site inspections rests with the contracting agencies funding the
construction.
The DOL determines the coverage of the Davis-Bacon
Act and related statutes and issues prevailing wage rates.
In addition, coordinating and oversight responsibilities rest
with the DOL. To accomplish this task they issue regulations to be followed by the contracting agencies and conduct their own investigations of alleged violations when it
is deemed necessary to do so."
The Comptroller General also has enforcement responsibilities under the Act.' 8 S/he must reimburse workers for
any wages due them from payment withheld from noncompliant contractors. S/he is also authorized to debar contractors from receiving government contracts for a period
of three years when they have committed violations which
constitute a disregard of their obligation to employees and
subcontractors.' 9
qn

iii. Some Recent Developments
The Davis-Bacon Act has been a controversial statute
since its inception, a controversy that has intensified in recent years. In 1979, for instance, the National Right to
Work Committee targeted prevailing wage laws across the
country, helping to file 52 bills to weaken or repeal them
in state legislatures. 2 ° Since then state prevailing wage laws
in Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, New Hampshire and
Utah have been repealed.2 1
On the federal level the strategy has developed to attack Davis-Bacon piecemeal through the appropriations
process - attaching provisions to particular appropriations
bills that would limit the applicability of Davis-Bacon to that
particular expenditure area. 22 One of the latest federal administration attempts has been a maneuver by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
to block states, including New York, from applying their
prevailing wage laws to federally-assisted housing projects. 23 Not surprisingly, these legislative attempts coincided
with the publication of a wealth of literature - research,
24
studies, editorials and articles - criticizing the Act.
Simultaneously, the DOL, intending to bolster DavisBacon and to ward off some of the heat directed towards
their department, aggressively activated the administrative
rule- alteration machinery by publishing changes in the
Federal Register on Dec. 28, 1979.25 These changes in the
proposed regulations were surmised as making Davis26
Bacon more costly but more restraining on contractors.
The final version of these regulations was published on Jan.
16, 1981, with a scheduled effective date of Feb. 17, 1981.
However, on Feb. 16, the then new Labor Secretary
Donovan published a notice delaying implementation of the
regulations. After a series of further delays and extensions,
Secretary Donovan published new proposed Davis-Bacon
regulations which differed substantially from the originally
proposed regulations. The final version of the regulations
was published in May of 198227 and was branded by many
as having a deleterious effect on workers involved in construction. 28 The changes included: revising the definition
of prevailing wage; instituting a new prohibition against using metropolitan wage data for setting prevailing rates in
rural counties and vice versa; instituting a new prohibition
against using wage rates paid on Davis-Bacon projects as
a basis for developing future wage determinations; expanding the permitted used of semi-skilled helpers whenever
the helper classification was identifiable in the area; and
allowing contractors to submit a weekly statement certifying compliance with wage requirements instead of requiring the submission of the actual weekly payrolls. Secretary
Donovan's justification for the changes in the proposed
regulations appears to have been based on the high cost
of implementing the Act, 29 a justification which many have
criticized. The Davis-Bacon Act after all was not and is
not designed to save the government or contractors
money."
But the battle did not stop with the implementation
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of these new regulations; protracted litigation followed. The
Building & Construction Trades Department of the AFLCIO acted quickly to enjoin use of the new regulations by
filing an action in the U.S. District Court of the District of
Columbia on June 11, 1982, seeking a preliminary injunction. 31 A preliminary injunction was granted and in its final
deposition issued five months later, the unions were granted
summary judgment on all of the provisions except the
elimination of the 30 percent rule to define prevailing
wage.3 2 An appeal by both parties to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ensued, resulting in an opinion similar to the district courfs opinion. Although invalidating the regulation elimination submission of actual
weekly payroll records, and ordering modifications of the
regulations to require that semi-skilled helpers be "prevailing" rather than "identifiable" in an area, the court upheld
the Departmentfs authority to permit a wider use of helpers
and modify the rules for surveying wages. 33 The AFL-CIO's
petition to the Supreme Court was denied 34 and the new
regulations became law.
But the battle is far from over. Efforts continue on all
fronts to weaken or repeal the Act. One such effort, which
has had an enormous impact on the Act's effectiveness,
has been the failure to enforce the Act. Although limiting
Davis-Bacon applicability, instituting regulatory changes
and pushing for its repeal all have significant impact,
nothing has a greater effect on the morale and confidence
of the construction worker - whom the Act is designed
to protect - than the failure to enforce the Act and punish
those who violate it.
Enforcement problems have plagued the Act since its
inception and are particularly troubling today given the
stance of the previous administration 3 and no doubt the
current administration. The lax enforcement by the DOL
is not unique to the Davis-Bacon Act; it reflects the overall
hostile policy of the Republican administration towards
worker protection statutes. According to one commentator,
it is clear that the Reagan administration regarded the enforcement of health and safety regulations as a nuisance. 36
Additionally, recent studies indicate that the government's
approach to the Fair Labor Standards Act has resulted in
many of the same compliance problems facing the Davis
Bacon Act, a not all too surprising fact considering that
the Wage & Hour Division of the DOL is responsible for
enforcing both statutes. "A U.S. Government Accounting
Office (GAO) report issued in September 1985 updated
a 1981 report which had concluded that noncompliance
with minimum wage, overtime and record-keeping provisions of the FLSA was a serious and continuing problem
and that the DOL was not seeking maximum compensation." 7 The statement of former Labor Secretary William
Brock, testifying before a Congressional Committee,
reflects well the position the Reagan administration held
towards the Davis-Bacon Act: "I 'don't think it's possible,
Mr. Chairman, for us to enforce this law on every rinkydink contract that comes along at $10,000 or 20,000 or

SPRING

1989

100,000. "38

In 1988, the DOL uncovered 2222 violations of the
Davis- Bacon Act and recovered $14,972,798 owed to
17,513 employees. 39 These numbers highlight the need to
make enforcement the top priority of those people and
agencies whose job it is to ensure that the Act is complied
with.
Violations of the Davis-Bacon Act are a serious problem and need to be seriously addressed. Creating regulations aimed at reducing administrative costs do nothing to
answer this problem and may in fact just make it worse.4"
The words of one contractor, speaking about a violator of
Davis-Bacon on a $400 million dollar rapid project station,
illustrate this point:
He was hiring Haitian people from the government detention center, that were just being picked up on the boats, and bringing them to the
job site and working them for the most substandard wages that you could ever believe, far
below the minimum wage.
And when this was brought to the attention of
the Labor Department, by the time they were
able to do anything to rectify it, this individual
had gone bankrupt and drawn out a large portion of his money, approximately 80 percent,
and had done only about 25 or 30 percent of
the work.
This is where our problem lies, in the enforcement of this law. We have to see that the Labor
Department gets on top of it, because the problems that exist out there in the market have
to be corrected, and Davis-Bacon provides that
correction only if it is enforced. 4
The current focus by the Secretary of Labor, the
legislators, and the scholars, on the economics of the Act,
is a misplaced one which disregards the purpose of the Act.
By enacting the Davis-Bacon Act, Congress demonstrated
that it preferred a wage floor for workers rather than a
reduction of government expenses. 42 Failure to enforce this
wage floor completely disregards Congressional intent.
One final word remains on whom the Act is designed
to protect. A commonly held perception is that the DavisBacon Act, because it is supported by organized labor, is
merely a pro-union piece of legislation. 43 While it is true
that union workers reap the benefit of the wage protections,
union contractors are able to avoid competing at a disadvantage because of it and this concededly reduces pressure
to look for non-union contractors, the Act provides important safeguards to all workers regardless of their union
status. Indeed workers who are not unionized perhaps are
in greater need of its protections because they can not turn
to a union for protection. Among unionized contractors,
wage cutting practices are constrained by the requirements
31

of collective bargaining agreements which contain specified
wage rates. Among non-union employers, however, there
are no such restraints. 44 Thus, while the Davis-Bacon Act
protects the livelihood of union employees, it is also a very
effective wage protection for construction workers who do
not have the benefit of union representation and negotiated
work agreements.
II. ORIGINS OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT
AND ITS CURRENT RELEVANCE
A. Statutory History
The Davis-Bacon Act, like most early federal labor
laws, was preceded by state statutes. By the time the
original Davis-Bacon Act became federal law in 1931,
seven states had already enacted prevailing wage statutes
for construction work performed under contracts let by
those states. Kansas was the first state to do so, adopting
its statute in 1891.'- Prior to the 1930's, wages on federal
construction projects were lower than wages on local projects because federal agencies were required to award contracts to the lowest bidder. 46 Contractors who took
advantage of growing unemployment by utilizing itinerant
laborers at lower wages underbid local contractors and thus
won the government contract.
.During the 1930's this problem became accentuated
because the federal government became engaged in significant construction programs for public buildings throughout
the U.S.47 The Great Depression had generated armies of
jobless workers, with jobs so scarce that wage-cutting had
become a regular practice and national conscience was
aroused by the effect of widespread unemployment on the
wages of workers. The lower wage rates paid by exploitative contractors not only undermined the federal
building program but also led to labor strife and broken
contracts. Consequently, the Davis Bacon Act was passed to ensure that workers on federal projects would receive
48
a minimum wage based on local prevailing rates.
Representative Bacon said in the debate on the House bill:
A practice has been growing up in carrying out
the building program where certain itinerant, irresponsible contractors, with itinerant, cheap,
bootleg labor, have been going around the
country "picking" off a contract here and a contract there, and local labor and the local contractors have been standing on the sidelines
looking in. Bitterness has been caused in many
communities because of this situation.
This bill ... is simply to give local labor and
the local contractor a fair opportunity to participate in this building program.49
In 1931 the building trades were the most strongly
organized group in the labor m6vement and their support
played a part in the Act's passage. Yet it is by no means
true that their support was the only or even the key reason

32

for the Act's passage.50 It must be remembered that it was
Republicans, not Democrats (the so called allies of organized labor) who sponsored the Act and that they were as
much concerned with the stability of the construction
industry-" as with the level of wages to be paid to construction workers. 2
The bill which became law in 1939 was a very limited
measure and bears only slight resemblance to the statute
in its present form; it did not provide for predetermination
of prevailing wages by the Secretary and it did not establish
any enforcement mechanisms. In response to the
widespread evasion of the 1931 Act, Congress conducted
hearings on the topic in 1932 and 193453 which resulted
in the amendment of 193514 and also the Copeland "AntiKickback" Act of 1934.-" The 1935 amendment required
that the Secretary of Labor predetermine wages and
ultimately led to Labor's promulgation of the prevailing
wage regulations.5 6 The Copeland Act made it a federal
crime to induce workers to pay back the income ensured
by the establishment of a prevailing wage.
The other significant amendment was enacted in 1964
in response to the changing pattern of wage payments.5 7
By this time fringe benefits had become a large portion of
the compensation received by the workers. Yet, the labor
force of a local community could continue to lose govemment contracts to competitors who were able to underbid
them by denying their workers fringe benefits. 8 The effect
of the amendment was to require wage determinations to
specify not only locally prevailing hourly rates of pay, but
also locally prevailing fringe benefits expressed as hourly
rates.
B. The Davis-Bacon Act and the Modern Era
The theory behind the passage of the Davis-Bacon Act
is as valid today as it was when the original law was passed. Despite the many changes that have occurred since the
1930's, the driving down of wages continues to be a particular danger in construction, because labor is still likely
to be the only element of cost over which an employer can
exercise any degree of short-term control.5 9
Furthermore, "[t]o say that this law is obsolete or to
say that it is anachronistic is to ignore the reality of the
60
construction industry and the lives of the workers in it."
Inherent conditions in the construction industry make
Davis-Bacon more needed today than ever before. Construction work is seasonal, hazardous and subject to an
extensive amount of downtime due to adverse weather conditions and industrial controversy. Most workers in construction move from project to project and are unemployed
between projects. Consequently, at any one point in time
there is usually a large pool of jobless workers.
Construction is not the prime source of wage and
salary employment for many of the individuals who work
in the industry. 6' About one-third of the construction
workers find employment in the industry for only one of
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the four quarters in the year and more than one fourth of
the industry's total work force earn more of their annual
income in some other industry. The construction industry
typically has an unemployment rate twice the national
average and this high rate of unemployment subjugates the
62
construction worker to a greater likelihood of exploitation.
One union official noted that his members worked an
average of 1200 hours this year (equivalent of 3/5 of the
hours of a full time worker), which is a number higher than
usual. 63 So although hourly construction wages are high,
annual earnings are low, lower in fact than those of their
counterparts in substantially all other industries except retail
64
trade and services.
Another unique feature of the construction industry is
its large number of small employers, a situation which
engenders fierce competition. According to the Small
Business Administration, in 1984 approximately fifty-seven
percent of all construction employees worked in firms
employing less than fifty persons. 65 The low capital requirements for entry into the industry, often only a set of
tools, allows the individual entrepreneur to hire a few
workers and form his or her own company. 66 Thus, it is
clear that the need for Davis-Bacon arises out of the nature
of the construction industry itself and not the prevailing
economic conditions.
III. VIOLATIONS OF THE DAVIS-BACON ACT
A. Nature And Extent of Violations
The above section illustrates why violations of the
Davis- Bacon Act still occur at persistent and high rates
in the construction industry. Among the most common
forms of abuse of the Act are the following:
Kickback Practices: Despite the presence of the
Copeland 'Anti-Kickback" Act 67 workers are still being forced to kickback part of their wages to obtain or retain a job
or to reduce the legally required wage which the workers
must receive through Davis-Bacon protections .68
Payroll Falsification and Manipulation of Work
Hours: Employers, aware of the Act's requirements 69 in
this respect, reduce, on the payroll records, the number of
hours that employees worked. A worker whose prevailing
wage is determined to be $20.00 per hour and who works
a full forty hour week should be paid $800.00. Instead, an
employer may pay this worker $400.00 and write in on
the payroll records that this worker only worked 20 hours
that week. Thus, the amount the worker was paid
($400.00) and the amount the payroll indicates they were
paid comports. But the worker is being cheated out of half

his or her salary.
Manipulation of work hours also frequently occurs
when a worker participates in two separate projects for one
contractor. Many times these tvo projects will be let by
two separate federal agencies and thus the payroll records
will be kept separately, each by the respective federal agen-
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cies involved in the project. If the worker puts in 35 hours
for one project during a week, and 20 hours on the other
project during that same week, s/he should be receiving
15 hours in overtime pay (hours worked in excess of 40
hours per week) and the payroll records should reflect this.
However, since the payroll records for the different projects are kept separately and never inspected together, there
is no way to determine that overtime is being worked.70
Diversion of Fringe Benefit Payments: As enforcement agents get wiser so do the contractors, who always
try and remain one step ahead of the game. Thus, blatant
falsification of documents has become less frequent and
abusing the fringe benefits packages has become more
prevalent." Fringe benefits are easily concealable in the
construction industry because of workers' mobility and
failure of the DOL to require contractors to specify fringe
benefit packages being purchased for the workers. Often
these payments are not made to the appropriate fund, or
are put into an annuity that a worker cannot get to.
Misclassification of Workers: A major source of
present-day violations continues to involve workers who
are paid at the rate for one craft while doing the work of
a different, higher paid craft.7 2 Since the prevailing wage
for different crafts in a single locale can vary as much as
$15.00 per hour, willful misclassification can cheat a worker
out of great sums of money.
A case arising out of the construction of a brick training building at the Trident Submarine Base in Kings Bay,
Georgia is a good example of this sort of violation. In 1985
the Navy let this three year contract to Blake Construction Company for $96.3 million. On August 13, 1985 the
Heavy and Highway Committee made a Freedom of Information Act request to the Department of the Navy for
certified payroll records submitted by Blake. Review of the
certified payrolls revealed that there was outright
misclassification of workers resulting in thousands of
dollars in wage underpayment. For example, in one pay
period there were twenty-four bricklayers, paid at the rate
of $10.00 an hour, to twenty-eight mason tenders, paid
at the rate of $5.00 an hour, according to the predetermined rate. Mason tenders assist bricklayers on the job.
"There is no situation in the construction of a brick building
as is being built at the Trident Submarine Base that the
number of mason tenders would equal or exceed the
number of bricklayers. Indeed, most commonly, the ratio
is one mason tender to each two bricklayers. Thus, it is
readily apparent from the certified payroll reports submitted by Blake that the people classified as mason tenders
were in fact doing bricklayers' work and should have been
paid at the $10.00
rate rather than the $5.00 rate of a
73
mason tender."
Similarly, a contractor can classify a skilled worker as
an apprentice or trainee and thus claim s/he is not entitled
to the prevailing rate. The regulations set forth that an ap33

prentice or trainee can be paid less than the prevailing wage
only if s/he is enrolled in a bona fide training program.74
The purpose behind this program is to insure an ongoing
pool of skilled workers and to protect workers from being
forever destined to low paying, dead end jobs. Many contractors take advantage of this category by paying workers
at a lower rate while they receive no real training. One commentator recounts the testimony, before Congress, of the
Office of Navajo Labor Relations describing how Navajos
had been victimized in this precise manner because the
Davis-Bacon "apprenticeship" regulations were not being
enforced on the Navajo Reservation. "Our 1973 investigation of such programs indicated that these programs were
mainly designed to create a cheap labor force for the contractor. As an example, one contractor set up a six month
program and paid the Navajos $2.25 per hour, then he ended the training programs after six months and laid off the
trainees on grounds that the journeymen workforce was
sufficient."75
B. Statistical Information Regarding
Violations and A Concrete Example
According to DOL statistics (cited above) 2,222 of the
2,892 investigations undertaken in fiscal year 1988 resulted
in findings of violations with $14,972,798 being recovered
in back wages for 17,513 employees. 6 It should be noted
that this $14 million figure represents the amount contractors agreed to pay in back wages - i.e. the settlement
figure- not the amount actually due. And since many
violators are never caught, it is safe to assume that this
figure represents only a portion of the amount unlawfully
withheld from workers.
A concrete example of a Davis-Bacon violator is useful
in highlighting enforcement problems and the regularity with
which these violations occur. The example of Janik Paving & Construction Inc. 77 is particularly enlightening
because it culminated in a Court of Appeals case challenging the debarment order.
Janik Paving has been primarily engaged in the
highway paving and construction business in and around
Buffalo since 1979. Most of the projects Janik has been
involved in received federal funding. 8 In 1980, Janik was
awarded two contracts that obligated it to pay the laborers
and mechanics it employed on these contracts the wages
79
prevailing for similar construction in the same localities.
Local 17, of the International Union of Operating
Engineers, through questioning the employees, uncovered
a number of infractions of the prevailing rate laws in overtime payments, including questionable fringe deductions,8 °
which enabled Janik to compete unfairly with union contractors. A complaint was filed with the New York State
Labor Department for the Western District of N.Y., whose
investigative staff for Davis-Bacon violations include four
field investigators, one senior' investigator and one
secretary. 8 Violations were uncovered and $3,213.45 was
originally withheld and later settled for the sum of $1400.

14

A complaint for the same time period was filed with
the U.S. Department of Labor for the Western District of
N.Y. The investigative staff at this office totals thirteen,
but in addition to Davis-Bacon violations these officers Investigate various federal labor standards laws. 2 Between
February and June of 1981, the Wage & Hour Division
investigated Janik's performance by inspecting payroll
records and employee time cards, and interviewing past
and present employees. Based on these findings the Division concluded that certain employees had not been paid
overtime rates and that certain payroll records were
falsified. 3 On May 9, 1983, Janik was notified that they
would be debarred from future federally-sponsored work
84
and on May 25 Janik requested an administrative hearing.
More than two years later an evidentiary hearing was
held before an administrative law judge during which one
of Janik's former employees, Richard Pollard,
testified that he visited Janik's offices at one
point to ask about his hours and discovered
that the timecards Janik had maintained on him
were not the same as those he had submitted
and that the hours on Janik's timecards were
different from those he had reported. Pollard
stated William Janik then telephoned and indicated that he would discharge him if he turned Janik in to the Department of Labor!8
The Administrative Law Judge found that Janik's violations
were willful, debarred the company for a two year period,
and ordered Janik to pay back wages to specified
employees.8 6 After unsuccessfully appealing to the DOL's
Wage Appeals Board, Janik commenced an action to
preliminarily enjoin the implementation of the debarment
order in federal district court for the Western District of
N.Y.. The action was dismissed and on appeal the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the ALJ's
holding."
IV. ENFORCING THE DAVIS-BACON ACT:
A CALL FOR CHANGE
The above example highlights the nature and extent
to which workers are being cheated out of money which
is rightfully theirs.8 8 Solutions to enforcement problems
need to be found and implemented immediately. The
following is an outline of some possible changes that could
be undertaken to ensure greater complicity with the Act.
A. Statutory Changes
Legislation to Protect "Whistleblowing"
Workers: Due to the regulatory allocation of Davis-Bacon
enforcement and the cutback in staff at the various DOL
offices, 9 almost all investigations by DOL are currently
reactive, undertaken in response to complaints, instead of
mandatory routine investigations. This method of enforcement means that the onus is on the worker to activate the
enforcement mechanisms. And although the DOL keeps
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information confidential, workers are often asked to testify
(as in the Janik example) or submit written affidavits. In
an industry that is no newcomer to corruption, greed and
blacklisting,9" statutory protection of workers who lodge
complaints and initiate investigations needs to be built in
to the Davis-Bacon Act.
There are several federal statutes that protect both
private and public sector employees who disclose information or engage in sanctioned activities, 91 and numerous
state statutes have recently been enacted specifically to promote employee disclosure of information that would lead
to correcting or preventing violations of law. These federal
laws vary in the activities they protect and the manner in
which allegations of reprisal are investigated and adjudicated. 92 The statutory protections often appear as an
appendage to an underlying substantive regulatory program
rather than as the result of efforts to structure comprehensive employee protections. 93 Such an appendage to the
regulatory program of the Davis-Bacon Act is sorely
needed.
Legislation of this kind could not only make it a crime
to harass or blacklist such employees, but might also provide for temporary financial support and/or job training for
a worker who is no longer able to maintain his livelihood
in this industry because of blacklisting. Unlike most other
industiies, reinstatement and/or promotion would not be
available since construction jobs are short-lived. One law
review commentator concisely summed up the benefits and
purposes of such legislation:
The object of protecting whistleblowers is to encourage them to have a personal investment in
the enforcement of laws and in the integrity of
their organizations. Whistleblower are an aid
in enforcing statutes and in furthering public
policy; it is conceivable that the very existence
of whistleblower protections is an incentive that
encourages employers to comply with laws,
rules, and other standards of conduct. The
likelihood that an employee will make the personal investment to blow the whistle will increase if the threat of retaliation or reprisal is
94

reduced.

Stiffer Criminal Penalties: Fines and the possibility
of debarment are not sufficient deterrents to violators.
Often times the penalty for violators does not amount to
a hardship because the only result is that the contractor
has to make remuneration. Thus, s/he is no worse off if
s/he violates the law and gets caught, a problem which is
in no way unique to Davis-Bacon violations but which is
a pervasive problem in worker protection statutes. 95
Although the Copeland "Anti-Kickback" Act provides
96
that weekly payroll forms are subject to the criminal code,
this language is not strong enough. The law should explicitly provide that whoever induces another to give up his entitled wages in any way shall face criminal charges, including
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imprisonment. Accompanying this statutory change should
be the increased effort to impose criminal penalties, rather
than just civil, upon those who violate the Act. Unfortunately, criminal prosecutions for these violations, as well as
violations under other worker protection statutes, are
unusual. A study by the GAO of DOL's Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) enforcement practices (undertaken by
the same division which is responsible for the Davis-Bacon
Act) indicates that regional directors in at least four regions
could not recall having filed a criminal suit under the Act
in more than ten years. 97 This trend must be reversed. In
support of this change is the information intimated by officials at both the federal and state DOL regarding the
noticeable "chilling effect" the imposition of a jail sentence
for violators had on other contractors.9"
B. Regulatory Changes
Payroll Records: Due to the prevalence of payroll
falsification and the manipulation of work hours, a requirement that payroll records contain more detailed information is necessary. Requiring that carbon-copy time cards
signed by employees, noting when work began and when
work ended for each day of employment, be kept on file
(one with the federal agency, the other with the worker)
would also be another safeguard against abuse. However,
any additional paperwork requirements are sure to come
under a crossfire of criticism as adding to an already costly program. The paperwork requirements of the Act are
one of its most vulnerable points for attack, prompting
William Brock, former Secretary of the DOL, to state before
a Congressional committee: "I really do think that weekly
reporting requirement is not only onerous but unnecessary
and, frankly, a waste of time and energy. We don't do
anything with those reports except file them. There really
is no value to that kind of process other than in use of
warehouse space, which the taxpayers have to pay for. I
think it's ridiculous."9 9 However, the FLSA contains recording requirements almost identical to the Davis-Bacon Act,
and like Davis-Bacon, requires the retention of payroll
records for three years.' Thus government construction
contractors will not be relieved of their obligation to maintain and preserve payroll records for three years even if the
Davis-Bacon did not contain these requirements. In addition, the failure of DOL to make use of these records
highlights DOL's lax enforcement, rather than the record's
uselessness. "Generalized recordkeeping requirements can
provide an alternative means by which agencies can ensure the availability of information for potential enforcement
action, as well as a means to check the accuracy of any
reports filed with the agency."' 0' In the words of one labor
official: "[f]or the Department of Labor to concede that
these agencies do not conduct systematic reviews of these
reports is nothing less than an admission that enforcement
of the law is a sham."0 2 Despite the reasons for better
recordkeeping, it is still unlikely that an administration so
bent on "cost savings" would adopt this additional, albeit
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important, paperwork requirement.
To detect the more subtle problem engendered when
one employee simultaneously works two projects for a
single contractor, payroll forms should specify wages earned for the particular job and then total hours and wages
earned by that employee for that week. This requirement
would cut down on the problem of "hidden overtime".
Ending Dual Enforcement: The transfer of primary
responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the Act from
the federal procurement agency to the DOL would have
a major impact on the enforcement problems plaguing the
Act. It is the DOL staff which has the expertise to investigate violations.' 0 3 The personnel at the various contracting agencies often have no great interest in enforcing
the law on their respective projects. It is not only that they
do not attach a high priority to the administrative needs
of Davis-Bacon, but they also tend to look at the Act as
a barrier to their acceptance of the lowest bid. The contracting agency concerned with minimizing its own costs
on a federal construction project is not the most likely participant to safeguard the rights of laborers and mechanics
because the requirement to pay prevailing wages increases
those costs. This conflict of interest has been described
by one author as a situation in which "the home team not
only plays its own baseball game, but umpires as well."'0 4
Of course, placing all the enforcement responsibilities
in the hands of the DOL would require increasing its investigative staff. The current ninety-four full time investigative officers working on Davis-Bacon 0 5 would not
be a sufficient number to handle an increased enforcement
effort. It would cost quite a bit to increase the staff at DOL;
however, in the long term there would be monetary savings since the federal government is currently losing millions
of dollars to contractors cheating workers. If Davis-Bacon
was enforced these millions would be in the hands of
workers - who would no longer need public assistance,
unemployment benefits, etc. - and returned to the communities in which they live. "[W]hen you have prevailing
rates that provide benefits, it provides the construction
worker with health and welfare pension and training, and
the result is that the worker who gets these benefits
becomes a net contributor to the community and to the
Government rather than a net user. If a person does not
get these benefits they ultimately have to go to the Federal
Government."' 0 6 The Davis-Bacon Act "affects not just
costs but also, the lives of many hundreds of thousands
of American workers and affects their wages, and that in
turn, affects the economic lives of not only their families
but their communities as well. So this issue goes beyond
a matter of mere bookkeeping, accounting, or paperwork,
07
and indeed it touches the lives of millions of Americans."'
C. Other Changes
Educating Workers About the Davis-Bacon Act:
Since much of the initiative for investigations now comes
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from worker's complaints and union investigations' 0 8 rather
than mandatory routine investigations, it is imperative that
workers understand the protections afforded to them under
the Davis-Bacon Act. In addition, workers need to be
educated as to how contractors falsify documents so they
can catch it themselves, and they must be encouraged to
keep their own records of hours worked. An education program of this sort can be undertaken by the various unions
in the building and construction trades. However, such a
program would not reach non-union workers who, because
they lack union protection and collective bargaining
agreements, are in great need of this information.
Access to Payroll Records and Disclosure of File
Material: As was stated above, in many locales, it is the
building trades unions and committees jointly funded by
unions and contractors who are currently responsible for
discovering many Davis-Bacon violations.10 9 In monitoring compliance with the Act, union locals, intimately
knowledgeable as to the contractors likely to be cheating
in their locale, request copies of certified weekly payroll
reports filed by contractors through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 110
Several years ago, however, it became apparent that
many local unions were being denied copies of certified
payroll reports from the federal agencies which held them
on file . " This trend eventually led to a 1984 district court
case originating in Buffalo, N.Y.' 12 The court held that certified weekly payroll reports were subject to disclosure under
FOIA because the union was seeking information to protect wages and fringe benefits, which its members presently
received, from unlawful competition, thus outweighing any
personal privacy interest which the employees might have
against disclosure of income from a job. 3 After a Court
of Appeals decision summarily affirmed the District Court
opinion," 4 many agencies have reconsidered their position concerning release of certified payroll reports, but other
agencies have not been so accommodating. In particular,
HUD (the subject of the 1984-85 litigation) continues to
resist compliance with the IBEW Local 41 precedent. ' "
In cases denying similar requests for certified payroll
reports, unions are forced to withstand delays and attomey's fees in exhausting administrative avenues. Once
these avenues are exhausted, they are forced to file suit,
thereby incurring unnecessary litigation expenses and further delays. Eventually, the requesting party (union) is vindicated and the federal government is forced to pay
reasonable attorneys' fees. Such a process is costly to the
unions, the federal government and the taxpayers, and is
counterproductive since all the unions are seeking to do
is supplement the federal government's enforcement of the
Davis-Bacon Act. A mechanism to ensure that the contracting agency immediately releases the requested payroll
information to the unions (either through a regulation,
stated policy or an expedited administrative procedure) is
needed. This is especially so considering that the unions
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can not gain access to contractor's records in any other
manner. Even if the DOL has undertaken an investigation
or is monitoring compliance on a particular project and in
their authority have demanded company records, including
payrolls, such records can not be shared with the unions.
Currently, under regulation 5.6(a)(4), none of the material
from the investigatory files of the DOL may be disclosed
officials charged with adto anyone other than Federal
'1 6
ministering the contract.
Disclosing such information to unions and joint labormanagement groups investigating compliance with DavisBacon would surely lead to more violators being caught.
However, there is a danger in allowing unions greater access to company records and file material: unions should
not shoulder the responsibility for enforcing this Act. Aside
from the problem of allowing unions to "police" federal laws,
investigations require time, resources and costs to unions
(often lacking in all three) that should be borne by the
government. "While all of these organizations should be
congratulated for their effort, the fact remains that private
groups are providing funding to do a job that the Department of Labor and procuring agencies are required by law
to do." 1 7 Thus, allowing unions greater access to contractors and the DOL's records must be done, if at all, with
the understanding that this access does not get the federal
government "off the hook" in their enforcement duties.
Judicial Review of Enforcement Activities: One
modification to the administrative procedures, suggested
by one law review commentator in 1980, that would ensure consistent and uniform enforcement was an express
grant of judicial review of enforcement activities. 1 8
However, given the outcome of a 1985 Federal Circuit case,
the likelihood of this occurring in the near future seems extremely slim. In Unity Bank & Trust Co. v. UnitedStates,"9
the Federal Circuit held that the Davis-Bacon Act did not
require the DOL to investigate contractors' wage reports
to ascertain whether a contractor was paying statutorily
mandated wages, and failure to do so did not breach any
duty to Unity Bank. 120 The case involved a contract entered
into by a painting contractor who took out a loan from Unity Bank to finance the project and as security for the loan
assigned to Unity Bank its right to payment under the contract. 12' After employees filed a complaint alleging they had
not received the prevailing minimum wage, an investigation revealed that employees had indeed been underpaid.' 22
The government withheld final payments on the contract
and Unity Bank filed suit to recover the amount of withheld
funds.' 2 3 The court held that enforcement of provisions of
Davis-Bacon did not require a higher degree of monitoring
where the DOL issued its first withholding request seven
weeks after receipt of complaints that the contractor was
not paying employees the prevailing wage.124 The court
concluded that all that was required was sufficient investigation as necessary to assure compliance, a decision which
125
rests with the agency.
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And therein lies the problem. Leaving monitoring and
investigation requirements up to the discretion of the federal
agency, whose interests often are antithetical to those of
the workers, 26 is virtually rolling out the red carpet to
violators. Leaving the determination of whether and when
to conduct an investigation of a contractor's compliance
with the prevailing wage provision to the discretion of the
federal agency, as the court did, perpetuates already inconsistent and insufficient enforcement. Granting judicial
review of the procurement agencies and the DOL's enforcement activities would ensure more uniform and more
stringent enforcement.
In reaching its conclusion the Court stated that "[t]he
mandatory and routine investigation that Unity Bank's position would require the DOL and the agencies to conduct
would creat6 an impossible administrative burden in light
of the thousands of federal construction contracts that are
being performed at any one time."' 27 However, the failure
to undertake these mandatory routine investigations currently creates a tremendous burden on thousands of
workers and their families who are being cheated out of
millions of dollars for which they worked. Why individual
workers should be forced to bear the cost of this burden,
rather than the federal government, was not explained by
the judge.
V. CONCLUSION
The Davis-Bacon Act is an early example of federal
involvement in social legislation. Like most social legislation it involves a major administrative undertaking and thus
substantial costs. What the judge in Unity Bank, Labor
Secretaries Donovan and Brock, the legislature and various
academics and scholars fail to understand is that to adequately protect construction workers from the wage cutting inherent in the construction industry, these costs must
be borne. Their economic analysis does not account for
the Act's contribution to social welfare.' 28 The purpose of
the Davis-Bacon Act is to protect the wages of construction workers even if the effect is to increase the costs of
construction to the federal government. Representative
Williams summed up this point most eloquently when he
stated before a Congressional Committee:
It seems to me that Davis-Bacon almost
[always], no matter how efficiently it is administered, is going to have one effect or the
other [increasing wages, or increasing the
Federal deficit]. I would come down on the side
of saying let's weight it towards a slight uplifting of wages rather than allowing it to depress
wages. It isn't designed to do either, but we're
all only human we can only administer the act,
and we're really better to fall on the side of increasing wages for Americans than we are
1 29
decreasing wages for Americans.
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Without a willingness to bear this administrative cost, we
are faced with the current situation - a failure to adequately
safeguard workers from exploitation.
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